Notice of RetractionControl rights contest in China´s listed-companies: Propping or tunneling

Notice of Retraction

After careful and considered review of the content of this paper by a duly constituted expert committee, this paper has been found to be in violation of IEEE´s Publication Principles.

We hereby retract the content of this paper. Reasonable effort should be made to remove all past references to this paper.

The presenting author of this paper has the option to appeal this decision by contacting TPII@ieee.org.

Mergers, acquisitions and restructurings is one of the most valid paths for capital expansion. The research expresses that the tunneling behavior of some large-shareholders sees not fresh often after control right contest, even more and more serious. And we also find after research: if listed-companies occur control rights fight, the lower operation performance of listed-companies, the lower of property rights transition, the ultimate controller is state-owned enterprises or government organs and when the organization of listed-companies has changed to state-owned enterprises, the more possibility that it has been tunneled. And the debt ratio is more high, the less possibility that it has been tunneled.