Notice of RetractionManufacturers´ shelf space competition with inventory subsidy contracts

Notice of Retraction

After careful and considered review of the content of this paper by a duly constituted expert committee, this paper has been found to be in violation of IEEE´s Publication Principles.

We hereby retract the content of this paper. Reasonable effort should be made to remove all past references to this paper.

The presenting author of this paper has the option to appeal this decision by contacting TPII@ieee.org.

In some retail contexts, displaying large quantities of inventory may stimulate demand. Manufacturers are therefore continuously battling for the retailer´s limited shelf space. This paper models the impact of inventory subsidy contracts on the competition between manufacturers. Consider a supply chain with two competing manufacturers and their common retailer. The retailer´s shelf-space-allocation decision when neither of the manufacturers offers inventory subsidies is analyzed as a benchmark. We then investigate the scenario where two independent manufacturers may both use inventory subsidy contracts to influence the retailer´s decision. We provide the condition under which the manufacturers would offer an inventory subsidy and characterize the equilibrium shelf-space-allocation.