DocumentCode
1642334
Title
Automating Open Bisimulation Checking for the Spi Calculus
Author
Tiu, Alwen ; Dawson, Jeremy
Author_Institution
Logic & Comput. Group, Australian Nat. Univ., Canberra, ACT, Australia
fYear
2010
Firstpage
307
Lastpage
321
Abstract
We consider the problem of automating open bisimulation checking for the spi calculus, an extension of the pi-calculus with cryptographic primitives. The notion of open bisimulation considered here is indexed by a (symbolic) environment, represented as bi-traces (i.e., pairs of symbolic traces), which encode the history of interaction between the intruder with the processes being checked for bisimilarity. A crucial part of the definition of this open bisimulation, that is, the notion of consistency of bi-traces, involves infinite quantification over a certain notion of “respectful substitutions”. We show that one needs only to check a finite number of respectful substitutions in order to check bi-trace consistency. Our decision procedure uses techniques that have been well developed in the area of symbolic trace analysis for security protocols. More specifically, we make use of techniques for symbolic trace refinement, which transform a symbolic trace into a finite set of symbolic traces in a certain “solved form”. Crucially, we show that refinements of a projection of a bitrace can be uniquely extended to refinements of the bi-trace, and that consistency of all instances of the original bi-trace can be reduced to consistency of its finite set of refinements. We then give a sound and complete procedure for deciding open bisimilarity for finite spi processes.
Keywords
bisimulation equivalence; cryptographic protocols; pi calculus; automating open bisimulation checking; cryptographic primitive; pi calculus; security protocol; spi calculus; symbolic trace analysis; Calculus; Cryptography; Nickel; Observers; Semantics; Syntactics; intruder deduction; open bisimulation; spi-calculus; symbolic trace analysis;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF), 2010 23rd IEEE
Conference_Location
Edinburgh
ISSN
1940-1434
Print_ISBN
978-1-4244-7510-0
Electronic_ISBN
1940-1434
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/CSF.2010.28
Filename
5552638
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