Title :
Information Flow Monitor Inlining
Author :
Chudnov, Andrey ; Naumann, David A.
Author_Institution :
Stevens Inst. of Technol., Hoboken, NJ, USA
Abstract :
In recent years it has been shown that dynamic monitoring can be used to soundly enforce information flow policies. For programs distributed in source or bytecode form, the use of just-in-time (JIT) compilation makes it difficult to implement monitoring by modifying the language runtime system. An inliner avoids this problem and also serves to provide monitoring for more than one runtime. We show how to inline an information flow monitor, specifically a flow sensitive one previously proved to enforce termination insensitive noninterference. We prove that the inlined version is observationally equivalent to the original.
Keywords :
data flow analysis; security of data; bytecode form; dynamic monitoring; information flow monitor inlining; just-in-time compilation; language runtime system; termination insensitive noninterference; Browsers; Java; Lattices; Monitoring; Runtime; Security; Semantics; Information flow; information security; program transformation; reference monitors;
Conference_Titel :
Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF), 2010 23rd IEEE
Conference_Location :
Edinburgh
Print_ISBN :
978-1-4244-7510-0
Electronic_ISBN :
1940-1434
DOI :
10.1109/CSF.2010.21