Notice of RetractionControlling shareholders, minority shareholders and interests conflicts: Evidence from family firms in China

Notice of Retraction

After careful and considered review of the content of this paper by a duly constituted expert committee, this paper has been found to be in violation of IEEE´s Publication Principles.

We hereby retract the content of this paper. Reasonable effort should be made to remove all past references to this paper.

The presenting author of this paper has the option to appeal this decision by contacting TPII@ieee.org.

Nowadays the problem of controlling shareholders infringing minority shareholders´ benefit has become the core to the company development. In order to prove the interest conflicts between the two and provide some helpful suggestions for minority shareholders protection, this paper has selected 82 listed family companies of China as the sample. And, by using the indirect method to establish a regression model and measuring the influence on enterprise value, which created by the separation of control and ownership of controlling shareholders, we try to proof if the infringement is existent. Then the result indicates that there is a negative correlation between the separation ratio of control and ownership and enterprise value. That is to say, when ownership goes smaller, the control goes bigger. Therefore, controlling shareholders´ infringement motive will be more strong and minority will be infringed more easier. On the other hand, a certain extent of ownership concentration can reduce the agency costs between controlling shareholders and managers. However, a high ownership concentration will result in some agency problem between controlling shareholder and minority shareholders.