DocumentCode
1649283
Title
Notice of Retraction
Game analysis and prevention mechanism for food quality supervision collusion
Author
Xin Ma ; Lu Shi
Author_Institution
Sch. of Manage. & Economic, North China Univ. of Water Conservancy & Electr. Power, Zhengzhou, China
Volume
2
fYear
2010
Firstpage
283
Lastpage
287
Abstract
Notice of Retraction
After careful and considered review of the content of this paper by a duly constituted expert committee, this paper has been found to be in violation of IEEE´s Publication Principles.
We hereby retract the content of this paper. Reasonable effort should be made to remove all past references to this paper.
The presenting author of this paper has the option to appeal this decision by contacting TPII@ieee.org.
Food quality and safety supervision department plays a pivotal role for the quality assurance in entire food supply chain. But the food safety supervision agency is an economic man, in the case of asymmetric information with the lack of supervision, If the punishment is not strict, food safety supervision department with information superiority may collusion together with agents to deceive the client in order to maximize its own interests, it is a typical opportunistic behavior under conditions of information asymmetry. By utilizing the game theory, the tripartite game behaviors of the food manufacture, the supervisor and the food retailer were analyzed and discuss the approach to effective prevent collusions.
After careful and considered review of the content of this paper by a duly constituted expert committee, this paper has been found to be in violation of IEEE´s Publication Principles.
We hereby retract the content of this paper. Reasonable effort should be made to remove all past references to this paper.
The presenting author of this paper has the option to appeal this decision by contacting TPII@ieee.org.
Food quality and safety supervision department plays a pivotal role for the quality assurance in entire food supply chain. But the food safety supervision agency is an economic man, in the case of asymmetric information with the lack of supervision, If the punishment is not strict, food safety supervision department with information superiority may collusion together with agents to deceive the client in order to maximize its own interests, it is a typical opportunistic behavior under conditions of information asymmetry. By utilizing the game theory, the tripartite game behaviors of the food manufacture, the supervisor and the food retailer were analyzed and discuss the approach to effective prevent collusions.
Keywords
food safety; game theory; quality management; retailing; supply chains; food quality supervision collusion; food retailer; food safety; food supply chain; game analysis; game theory; prevention mechanism; safety supervision department; collusion game model; food quality; prevention mechnism; supervision measures;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
Advanced Management Science (ICAMS), 2010 IEEE International Conference on
Conference_Location
Chengdu
Print_ISBN
978-1-4244-6931-4
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/ICAMS.2010.5552924
Filename
5552924
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