Notice of RetractionResearch on the relationship between managerial discretion and monitoring intensity: The case in China

Notice of Retraction

After careful and considered review of the content of this paper by a duly constituted expert committee, this paper has been found to be in violation of IEEE´s Publication Principles.

We hereby retract the content of this paper. Reasonable effort should be made to remove all past references to this paper.

The presenting author of this paper has the option to appeal this decision by contacting TPII@ieee.org.

There are rather few scholars who have discussed the role of monitoring intensity both in the western countries and in China when managerial discretion is discussed. However, this paper proposes that managerial discretion and monitoring intensity are the two associated mechanisms and they are also relatively independent with each other, and the two mechanisms simultaneously determine the rationality and validity of the power allocation system inside the corporation. According to this paper, there is significant difference in corporate governance between the western countries and China, and the absence of monitoring is the sticking point during the reform of the State-owned Enterprises in China and the validity of the power allocation system inside the corporation is codetermined by managerial discretion and monitoring intensity. In China, the investigation on managerial discretion, monitoring intensity should not be ignored.