Notice of RetractionA game of profit division by slotting fees in supply chain

Notice of Retraction

After careful and considered review of the content of this paper by a duly constituted expert committee, this paper has been found to be in violation of IEEE´s Publication Principles.

We hereby retract the content of this paper. Reasonable effort should be made to remove all past references to this paper.

The presenting author of this paper has the option to appeal this decision by contacting TPII@ieee.org.

In addition to selling through the traditional supply chain of manufacturer and retailer, this paper discusses that manufacturer sales its product through both high-end retailer and low-end retailer. This paper use a Stackelberg game to explain the role of manufacturer´s paying slotting allowance to the high-end retailers. Based on the analysis of this case, this paper finds the results that paying slotting allowance to the high-end retailers is manufacturer´s marketing strategies for increasing its profits. And manufacturer is not intended to profit from the high-end market, but to advertise its products and give a guiding role of price.