Title :
Notice of Retraction
Stackelberg game-theoretic model with stock-dependent demand and private information
Author :
Jie Min ; Gui-Qing Liu
Author_Institution :
Dept. of Math. & Phys., Anhui Univ. of Archit., Hefei, China
Abstract :
Notice of Retraction
After careful and considered review of the content of this paper by a duly constituted expert committee, this paper has been found to be in violation of IEEE´s Publication Principles.
We hereby retract the content of this paper. Reasonable effort should be made to remove all past references to this paper.
The presenting author of this paper has the option to appeal this decision by contacting TPII@ieee.org.
This paper presents a model for analyzing the impact of private information on behaviors of supply chain members under the manufacturer-Stackelberg setting. The model consider a distribution system in which a manufacturer supplies a single product to a retailer, who faces a current-stock-level-dependent demand. This paper focuses on two aspects. First, under common information, we briefly discuss the two members´ centralized and decentralized decisions in the manufacturer-Stackelberg setting. Second, this paper contributes by analyzing how two parties behave under the manufacturer-Stackelberg scenario if they have private cost information. Some interesting results have been obtained.
Keywords :
game theory; manufacturing processes; retailing; stock control; supply and demand; supply chain management; supply chains; Stackelberg game-theoretic model; centralized decision; current-stock-level-dependent demand; decentralized decision; manufacturer-Stackelberg setting; private information; retailer; supply chain member behavior; Equations; Mathematical model; Production; Two-echelon supply chain; manufacturer-Stackelberg; private information; stock-dependent demand;
Conference_Titel :
Advanced Management Science (ICAMS), 2010 IEEE International Conference on
Conference_Location :
Chengdu
Print_ISBN :
978-1-4244-6931-4
DOI :
10.1109/ICAMS.2010.5553088
