Notice of RetractionApplication of principal-agent model to the management of state-owned assets in China

Notice of Retraction

After careful and considered review of the content of this paper by a duly constituted expert committee, this paper has been found to be in violation of IEEE´s Publication Principles.

We hereby retract the content of this paper. Reasonable effort should be made to remove all past references to this paper.

The presenting author of this paper has the option to appeal this decision by contacting TPII@ieee.org.

An effective and restrained incentive mechanism is essential to the governance of the state-owned enterprises. Based on the deep analysis of the principal-agent model and the strategy model, this article analyzed the influence of the owners and operators of state-owned assets who pursue for their own maximum utility to the business activities. Combining with the updated theory concerning agent-incentive, it improved the principal-agent strategy model under incomplete information. Consequently, it analyzed the application of these models to the management of the state-owned assets of China, especially state-owned enterprises. Based on the present situation of state-owned assets´ management in China, it analyzed the deficiencies of these models, and gives several suggestions on improving the principal-agent relationship as well as the incentive and restrained mechanism in the management of state-owned assets of China.