Notice of RetractionBoard independence, executive overconfidence and M&A decision

Notice of Retraction

After careful and considered review of the content of this paper by a duly constituted expert committee, this paper has been found to be in violation of IEEE´s Publication Principles.

We hereby retract the content of this paper. Reasonable effort should be made to remove all past references to this paper.

The presenting author of this paper has the option to appeal this decision by contacting TPII@ieee.org.

Using 2006-2007 462 company year´s M&A sample as well as 231 CEO´s related data, we inspected company M&A decisions from the behavioral finance´s perspective. We make an empirical analysis on whether excessively self-confident CEOs are willing to undertake M&A. Using the change of stocks quantity owned by CEO as the measure standard of whether CEOs are excessively self-confident or not, we conduct a research on the above question. Our empirical analysis results indicate that the M&A wish of excessively self-confident president is high compared to non-overconfident president. But board independence can curb executive overconfidence, the more independent the board is, the more restrained executive overconfidence is, and the positive relationship between executive overconfidence and M&A is more weaker.