The stackelberg game of seller and the auction house

Author

Weixing, Yang ; Shulin, Liu

Author_Institution

School of International Trade and Economics, University of International Business and Economics, Beijing, School of Science, Beijing University of Chemical Technology

fYear

2011

Firstpage

1

Lastpage

5

Abstract

This paper studies a three-stage stackelberg game of seller and the auction house in a sealed-bid auction model with two parameters of a reserve price and a commission rate. We discuss two kinds of models. In the model one, the auction house is the leader and seller is the follower; in model two, seller is the leader and the auction house is the follower. We get the revenues of both seller and the auction house and then obtain the optimal reserve price set by the seller and the optimal commission rate set by the auction house for the two models. Finally, we conclude that the Pre-emptive strategy is the best strategy for the seller and the auction house for the two models and that the model two is a win-win model for the seller and the auction house since the revenues of both the seller and the auction house are more than that in the model one, respectively.

Keywords

Business; Econometrics; Educational institutions; Erbium; Games; International trade; optimal commission rate; optimal reserve price; sealed-bid auction; stackelberg game;

fLanguage

English

Publisher

ieee

Conference_Titel

E -Business and E -Government (ICEE), 2011 International Conference on

Conference_Location

Shanghai, China

Print_ISBN

978-1-4244-8691-5

Type

conf

DOI

10.1109/ICEBEG.2011.5882501

Filename

5882501