DocumentCode
1657923
Title
Pricing Scheme for Limiting Strategic Bidding on Sponsored Search Auction
Author
Li, Yan ; Liang, Songtao ; Zhang, Tao
Author_Institution
Sch. of Comput. Sci., Fudan Univ., Shanghai, China
fYear
2011
Firstpage
1
Lastpage
4
Abstract
We prove that the forward looking Nash equilibrium (FLNE) from the angle of dynamic strategic bidding is the subset of locally envy-free equilibrium. For limiting vindictive bidding in GSP and "sawtooth" bidding in GFP, we introduce a new pricing strategy and analyse its equilibrium and properties.
Keywords
game theory; pricing; set theory; strategic planning; FLNE; GFP; GSP; dynamic strategic bidding; forward looking Nash equilibrium; locally envy-free equilibrium subset; pricing scheme; sawtooth bidding; sponsored search auction; vindictive bidding; Computational modeling; Conferences; Games; Lattices; Limiting; Nash equilibrium; Pricing;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
Wireless Communications, Networking and Mobile Computing (WiCOM), 2011 7th International Conference on
Conference_Location
Wuhan
ISSN
2161-9646
Print_ISBN
978-1-4244-6250-6
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/wicom.2011.6040651
Filename
6040651
Link To Document