Title :
Pricing Scheme for Limiting Strategic Bidding on Sponsored Search Auction
Author :
Li, Yan ; Liang, Songtao ; Zhang, Tao
Author_Institution :
Sch. of Comput. Sci., Fudan Univ., Shanghai, China
Abstract :
We prove that the forward looking Nash equilibrium (FLNE) from the angle of dynamic strategic bidding is the subset of locally envy-free equilibrium. For limiting vindictive bidding in GSP and "sawtooth" bidding in GFP, we introduce a new pricing strategy and analyse its equilibrium and properties.
Keywords :
game theory; pricing; set theory; strategic planning; FLNE; GFP; GSP; dynamic strategic bidding; forward looking Nash equilibrium; locally envy-free equilibrium subset; pricing scheme; sawtooth bidding; sponsored search auction; vindictive bidding; Computational modeling; Conferences; Games; Lattices; Limiting; Nash equilibrium; Pricing;
Conference_Titel :
Wireless Communications, Networking and Mobile Computing (WiCOM), 2011 7th International Conference on
Conference_Location :
Wuhan
Print_ISBN :
978-1-4244-6250-6
DOI :
10.1109/wicom.2011.6040651
