DocumentCode
1660477
Title
Notice of Retraction
Retailer-leading supply chain analysis based on the supplier´s fairness preference
Author
Qi, Lu ; Li-mei, Wang
Author_Institution
Management Department Shan Dong Finance Institute JiNan, China
fYear
2011
Firstpage
1
Lastpage
4
Abstract
Notice of Retraction
After careful and considered review of the content of this paper by a duly constituted expert committee, this paper has been found to be in violation of IEEE´s Publication Principles.
We hereby retract the content of this paper. Reasonable effort should be made to remove all past references to this paper.
The presenting author of this paper has the option to appeal this decision by contacting TPII@ieee.org.
This paper studies the optimal decision and profit allocations in a retailer-leading supply chain when taking into consideration the supplier´s fairness preference. Under deterministic retail-market demand we analytically derive the retailer´s optimal markup, supplier´s optimal wholesale price as well as their profits expressions. Under stochastic retail-market demand, numerical computations are used to analyze the optimal decision and profit allocations with the variation of inequity coefficients. Results show that the conclusions of deterministic market demand and stochastic market demand are in substance consistent. On the one hand, the supplier will increase wholesale price as well as his profit when he experiences disadvantageous inequality; on the other hand, the dominant retailer will increase her markup as well as her profit when the supplier experiences advantageous inequality.
After careful and considered review of the content of this paper by a duly constituted expert committee, this paper has been found to be in violation of IEEE´s Publication Principles.
We hereby retract the content of this paper. Reasonable effort should be made to remove all past references to this paper.
The presenting author of this paper has the option to appeal this decision by contacting TPII@ieee.org.
This paper studies the optimal decision and profit allocations in a retailer-leading supply chain when taking into consideration the supplier´s fairness preference. Under deterministic retail-market demand we analytically derive the retailer´s optimal markup, supplier´s optimal wholesale price as well as their profits expressions. Under stochastic retail-market demand, numerical computations are used to analyze the optimal decision and profit allocations with the variation of inequity coefficients. Results show that the conclusions of deterministic market demand and stochastic market demand are in substance consistent. On the one hand, the supplier will increase wholesale price as well as his profit when he experiences disadvantageous inequality; on the other hand, the dominant retailer will increase her markup as well as her profit when the supplier experiences advantageous inequality.
Keywords
Collaboration; Contracts; Economics; Europe; Finance; Resource management; Supply chains; fairness preference; price-only equivalent contract; supply chain coordination;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
E -Business and E -Government (ICEE), 2011 International Conference on
Conference_Location
Shanghai, China
Print_ISBN
978-1-4244-8691-5
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/ICEBEG.2011.5882671
Filename
5882671
Link To Document