Research On The Questions Of Collusion And Collusion-Proof Equilibrium On The Quality Management System Certification Market In China

Problems of collusion and collusion-proof equilibrium on the quality management system certification (QMSC) market in China are discussed in this paper. Firstly, three situations of producing collusion on QMSC market are given. The behavior and its harms of collusion are analyzed from four aspects. Then the intrinsic mechanism of collusion-formed is opened out by building a three-player principal-agent model of CNCA, certification bodies and enterprises. By the model, the game mechanism of forming collusion-proof equilibrium on QMSC market is given. Based on the model analysis, this paper gives four pieces of advice to prevent collusion: (1) to increase the expectation value of punishing collusion behaviors; (2) to decrease the expectation payoff in the condition of collusion; (3) to increase the expected payoff of certificating for certification bodies with good faith; (4) enterprises have nonparticipation with collusion. Finally, four conclusions are given out