Notice of RetractionStudy on cooperation system for airdromes construction in Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei area

Notice of Retraction

After careful and considered review of the content of this paper by a duly constituted expert committee, this paper has been found to be in violation of IEEE´s Publication Principles.

We hereby retract the content of this paper. Reasonable effort should be made to remove all past references to this paper.

The presenting author of this paper has the option to appeal this decision by contacting TPII@ieee.org.

This article constructs the complete information static game to disclose the decisive factor on the cooperation and forms the point. the airdrome construction in Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei area. When Beijing Capital International Airdrome builds the second airdrome, the more income Tianjin and Shijiazhuang airdrome lose or the less income the national economy growth bring them, the more possibility the cooperation strategy become the only Nash equilibrium, meanwhile, the strong competition from the high speed railway net to civil aviation will cause the cooperation among the airdromes in Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei area. On the contrary, the game has two Nash equilibrium strategies more possibly, meanwhile, the complementarities between strategies make the low payoff equilibrium moving to the cooperation one with high payoff. When the central government normalizes the performance appraisal to the local government or subsidize the region neither building the new airdrome or enlarging the old one, the goal of cooperation is easy to achieve.