DocumentCode :
1704044
Title :
Inheritance of spatial neighbourhood: A feasible mechanism for evolution and maintenance of cooperation
Author :
Shaolin Tan ; Jinhu Lu ; Xinghuo Yu ; Hill, D.
Author_Institution :
Inst. of Syst. Sci., Acad. of Math. & Syst. Sci., Beijing, China
fYear :
2013
Firstpage :
1205
Lastpage :
1209
Abstract :
Cooperative behaviors are widespread in natural world and human societies, yet it can hardly emerge and be maintained in a population of selfish individuals under natural selection unless further mechanisms are introduced. It has recently demonstrated that spatial distribution and interactions of individuals facilitate survival of cooperation through network reciprocity of clustering cooperators. Here, we introduce another attractive profit of spatial distribution of individuals in favoring cooperation: inheritance of geographic advantage. We note that in spatial distributed populations, offspring inherits not only the phenotype but also the spatial neighborhood of its parents, which leads to that in evolutionary process, defectors accumulate from generation to generation and eventually destroy their living environment and then are eliminated, while cooperators prevail. We propose a mathematical model of this evolutionary mechanism. Numerical simulations and approximate analysis of the model confirm our prediction, which shows that high-level cooperation emerges and is maintained for a wide variety of cost-to-benefit ratio, even if mutation happens at some rate in the evolving process.
Keywords :
approximation theory; behavioural sciences; evolutionary computation; approximate analysis; clustering cooperators; cooperation evolution; cooperation maintenance; cooperation survival; cooperative behaviors; cost-to-benefit ratio; evolutionary process; geographic advantage; individual interaction; individual spatial distribution; natural selection; selfish individuals; spatial neighbourhood; Educational institutions; Evolution (biology); Games; Graphical models; Lattices; Sociology; Statistics; Cooperation; coevolution; evolutionary game dynamics;
fLanguage :
English
Publisher :
ieee
Conference_Titel :
Control Conference (CCC), 2013 32nd Chinese
Conference_Location :
Xi´an
Type :
conf
Filename :
6639610
Link To Document :
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