A Leak Resistant SoC to Counteract Side Channel Attacks

Author

Mesquita, Daniel ; Badrignans, Benoit ; Torres, Lionel ; Sassatelli, Gilles ; Robert, Michel ; Moraes, Fernando Gehm

Author_Institution

Lab. d´´Informatique, de Robotique et de Microelectronique de Montpellier, UMII, Montpellier

fYear

2006

Firstpage

1

Lastpage

4

Abstract

This work addresses the problem of hardware attacks against cryptographic circuits. The most dangerous side-channel attack: the differential power analysis (DPA) is discussed, as well the state of art countermeasures. Then new reconfigurable system on chip resistant against DPA attacks is proposed. Results shows that our architecture is efficient against DPA attacks, but also outcomes the performance of classical implementation of modular exponentiation, for key size exceeding 2048 bits, with a reasonable extra area overhead

Keywords

cryptography; reconfigurable architectures; system-on-chip; DPA attacks; cryptographic circuits; differential power analysis; hardware attacks; leak resistant system-on-chip; modular exponentiation; reconfigurable system-on-chip; side channel attacks; Art; Circuits; Computer architecture; Cryptography; Energy consumption; Hardware; Logic; Robots; Software algorithms; System-on-a-chip;

fLanguage

English

Publisher

ieee

Conference_Titel

System-on-Chip, 2006. International Symposium on

Conference_Location

Tampere

Print_ISBN

1-4244-0621-8

Electronic_ISBN

1-4244-0622-6

Type

conf

DOI

10.1109/ISSOC.2006.322005

Filename

4116446