Analyzing asking/bidding price in dynamic game for cooperative authentication

With the problem that the non-cooperation of selfish nodes causes by location privacy leakage and resource consumption, some researchers proposed a bargaining-based game for cooperative authentication in MANETs. In this game, a fundamental issue is to study how the asking/bidding price affects the cooperative willingness of nodes. To address the problem that the improvement of cooperative willingness in dynamic decision-making, a bargaining-based dynamic game is proposed to analyze the dynamic behavior of the asking/bidding price of nodes. Further, the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibriums and Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium are obtained to guide the player chooses its optimal strategy under complete and incomplete information, respectively. Finally, factors affect cooperative willingness have been analyzed and the simulation results indicate all positive factors, which cause a lower asking price and a higher bidding price, imply a higher cooperative willingness and a higher probability of successful cooperative authentication.