Title :
Reputation effect constraint for the alliance partner behavior
Author_Institution :
Econ. & Manage. Sch., Zhengzhou Univ. of Light Ind., Zhengzhou, China
Abstract :
This paper analyzes the problem that how the corporate reputation of alliance partners constraint their opportunistic behavior of holding-up. Additionally, alliance partners´ reputation is studied for the league´s leading companies to choose an effective partnership. The study research shows that the leading companies may infer the possibility of partner´s opportunistic behavior by evaluating the reputation of potential partners.
Keywords :
contracts; organisational aspects; alliance partner behavior; corporate partnership; corporate reputation; opportunistic hold-up behavior; reputation effect constraint; Companies; Reliability; constraint; hold-up; partners; reputation effects;
Conference_Titel :
Grey Systems and Intelligent Services (GSIS), 2011 IEEE International Conference on
Conference_Location :
Nanjing
Print_ISBN :
978-1-61284-490-9
DOI :
10.1109/GSIS.2011.6043962
