Agent-based simulation for simultaneous ultimatum games

The aim of this research is behavioral analysis of the human subjects in laboratory experiments of simultaneous ultimatum game through agent-based simulation. Andreoni and Blanchard (2006) conducted a laboratory experiments using human subjects, and they observed that deviant behavior of the subjects from Nash equilibrium. Similarly, in several laboratory experiments of ultimatum games in a form of sequential game, deviant behavior of the human subjects from subgame perfect equilibrium are observed. The related literature have suggested a mathematical model incorporating fairness of payoffs (Duffy and Hopkins; 1999), and adaptive models based on reinforcement learning (Duffy and Feltovich; 1999). This study constructs simulation model using adaptive agents which makes decision by trial and error approach based on neural networks and genetic algorithms. The experimental result indicates that the behavior of subjects can explained by decision mechanism by trial and error approach, interaction between human subjects, and risk attitude.