Regulation of supply quality in open electricity markets

Author

Arango, H. ; Abreu, J.P.G. ; Guimarães, C. A M ; Tahan, C.M.V. ; Gouvêa, M.R. ; Kagan, N.

Author_Institution

Inst. of Electr. Eng., Fed. Sch. of Eng., Itajuba, Brazil

Volume

1

fYear

2000

fDate

2000

Firstpage

185

Abstract

This paper addresses power quality (PQ) in view of regulation, i.e. the sets of rules contriving to optimal control of the market. The state of the market depends on: (1) investments; (2) consumers willingness; and (3) quality and price. The goal function is chosen as a net public welfare (W) arising from market transactions. (W) is expected to sway towards maximum by means of regulatory signals radiated whenever PQ fails to comply with elected standards. A linear model of an electricity market is devised, elucidating the main features of its optimal dynamic evolution. In order to illustrate the main points, Brazilian practices on reliability standards are succinctly described

Keywords

electricity supply industry; investment; optimisation; power supply quality; power system economics; power system reliability; standards; tariffs; Brazil; consumer willingness; electricity price; goal function; investment; linear model; market transactions; net public welfare; open electricity markets; optimal market control; power supply quality regulation; power supply reliability standards; regulatory signals; Costs; Electricity supply industry; Feedback control; Investments; Macroeconomics; Optimal control; Power engineering and energy; Power generation economics; Power markets; Power quality;

fLanguage

English

Publisher

ieee

Conference_Titel

Harmonics and Quality of Power, 2000. Proceedings. Ninth International Conference on

Conference_Location

Orlando, FL

Print_ISBN

0-7803-6499-6

Type

conf

DOI

10.1109/ICHQP.2000.897021

Filename

897021