Title :
Analysis of Electromagnetic Information Leakage From Cryptographic Devices With Different Physical Structures
Author :
Hayashi, Yasuhiro ; Homma, Noriyasu ; Mizuki, Takaaki ; Aoki, Toyohiro ; Sone, Hidekazu ; Sauvage, L. ; Danger, J.L.
Author_Institution :
Dept. of Electr. & Commun. Eng., Tohoku Univ., Sendai, Japan
Abstract :
This paper presents a novel analysis of electromagnetic (EM) information leakage from cryptographic devices, based on the electromagnetic interference (EMI) theory. In recent years, side-channel attack using side-channel information (e.g., power consumption and EM radiation) is of major concern for designers of cryptographic devices. However, few studies have been conducted to investigate how EM information leakage changes according to device´s physical parameters. In this paper, we introduce a cryptographic device model to analyze EM information leakage based on the EMI theory in a systematic manner. This device model makes it possible to acquire the frequency characteristics of EM radiation depending on physical parameters, such as board size and power-line length, accurately. The analysis results show that EM information leakage can be explained by the major EMI parameters such as board size and cable length attached to the board. In addition, we demonstrate that the intensity of EM information leakage from a generic device is also explained by board size and cable length.
Keywords :
cryptography; electromagnetic interference; telecommunication security; EM information leakage; EM radiation; EMI theory; cryptographic device model; cryptographic devices; different physical structures; electromagnetic information leakage analysis; electromagnetic interference; frequency characteristics; physical parameters; power consumption; side channel information; side-channel attack; Analytical models; Antenna measurements; Antennas; Correlation; Cryptography; Current measurement; Electromagnetic interference; Cryptographic devices; electromagnetic information leakage; electromagnetic interference (EMI); signal analysis; system security;
Journal_Title :
Electromagnetic Compatibility, IEEE Transactions on
DOI :
10.1109/TEMC.2012.2227486