Stackelberg Game for Cognitive Radio Networks With MIMO and Distributed Interference Alignment

In this paper, we investigate the problem of spectrum leasing in cognitive radio (CR) networks, while incorporating two advanced physical-layer technologies, i.e., multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) and distributed interference alignment. We present a cooperative spectrum leasing scheme for primary and secondary users to balance the tension between data transmission and revenue collection/payment. A Stackelberg game is formulated, where the primary user is the leader, and secondary users are followers. With backward induction, we derive the optimal strategies for primary and secondary users that can achieve the unique Stackelberg equilibrium, where no player can gain by a unilaterally changing strategy. We find that spectrum leasing is always beneficial to enhancing the utilities of primary and secondary users. The proposed scheme outperforms a no-spectrum-leasing scheme and a cooperative scheme presented in the literature with considerable gains, which demonstrate the benefits of spectrum leasing and distributed interference alignment and validates the efficacy of the proposed scheme.