Title :
Convergence of potential networked evolutionary games
Author :
Yuanhua Wang ; Ting Liu ; Daizhan Cheng
Author_Institution :
Inst. of Control Sci. & Eng., Shandong Univ., Jinan, China
fDate :
May 31 2014-June 2 2014
Abstract :
This paper considers when a potential networked evolutionary game (NEG) converges to a Nash equilibrium. First, based on the fundamental evolutionary equation, the profile dynamics of an NEG is revealed. Then we show that an NEG is potential, if the fundamental network game is. Finally, a sufficient condition for an NEG to converge to a Nash equilibrium is presented. An illustrative example is included to demonstrate the theoretical and numerical results.
Keywords :
convergence; evolutionary computation; game theory; network theory (graphs); NEG; Nash equilibrium; convergence; fundamental evolutionary equation; potential networked evolutionary games; Biology; Electronic mail; Games; Mathematical model; Nash equilibrium; Power system dynamics; Power system stability; Nash equilibrium; Networked evolutionary game; myopic best response adjustment rule (MBRAR); potential; semi-tensor product of matrices;
Conference_Titel :
Control and Decision Conference (2014 CCDC), The 26th Chinese
Conference_Location :
Changsha
Print_ISBN :
978-1-4799-3707-3
DOI :
10.1109/CCDC.2014.6852832
