• DocumentCode
    1786969
  • Title

    Fort-NoCs: Mitigating the threat of a compromised NoC

  • Author

    Ancajas, Dean Michael ; Chakraborty, Koushik ; Roy, Sandip

  • Author_Institution
    Bridge Lab., Utah State Univ., Logan, UT, USA
  • fYear
    2014
  • fDate
    1-5 June 2014
  • Firstpage
    1
  • Lastpage
    6
  • Abstract
    In this paper, we uncover a novel and imminent threat to an emerging computing paradigm: MPSoCs built with 3rd party IP NoCs. We demonstrate that a compromised NoC (C-NoC) can enable a range of security attacks with an accomplice software component. To counteract these threats, we propose Fort-NoCs, a series of techniques that work together to provide protection from a C-NoC in an MPSoC. Fort-NoCs´s foolproof protection disables covert backdoor activation, and reduces the chance of a successful side-channel attack by “clouding” the information obtained by an attacker. Compared to recently proposed techniques, Fort-NoCs offers a substantially better protection with lower overheads.
  • Keywords
    cryptography; industrial property; multiprocessing systems; network-on-chip; 3rd party IP NoCs; MPSoCs; accomplice software component; backdoor activation; compromised NoC; fort-NoCs foolproof protection; security attacks; side-channel attack; Hardware; IP networks; Measurement; Pipelines; Standards; System-on-chip; Trojan horses;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    Design Automation Conference (DAC), 2014 51st ACM/EDAC/IEEE
  • Conference_Location
    San Francisco, CA
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1145/2593069.2593144
  • Filename
    6881485