• DocumentCode
    1786997
  • Title

    FIGHT-metric: Functional identification of gate-level hardware trustworthiness

  • Author

    Sullivan, Dean ; Biggers, Jeff ; Guidong Zhu ; Shaojie Zhang ; Yier Jin

  • Author_Institution
    Dept. of Electr. Eng. & Comput. Sci., Univ. of Central Florida, Orlando, FL, USA
  • fYear
    2014
  • fDate
    1-5 June 2014
  • Firstpage
    1
  • Lastpage
    4
  • Abstract
    To address the concern that a complete detection scheme for effective hardware Trojan identification is lacking, we have designed an RTL security metric in order to evaluate the quality of IP cores (with the same or similar functionality) and counter Trojan attacks at the pre-fabrication stages of the IP design flow. The proposed security metric is constructed on top of two criteria, from which a quantitative security value can be assigned to the target circuit: 1) Distribution of controllability; 2) Existence of rare events. The proposed metric, called FIGHT, is an automated tool whereby malicious modifications to ICs and/or the vulnerability of the IP core can be identified, by monitoring both internal node controllability and the corresponding control value distribution plotted as a histogram. Experimentation on an RS232 module was performed to demonstrate our dual security criteria and proved security degradation to the IP module upon hardware Trojan insertion.
  • Keywords
    invasive software; logic design; FIGHT-metric; IP cores; IP design flow; IP module; RS232 module; RTL security metric; Trojan attacks; control value distribution; dual security criteria; dunctional identification; gate-level hardware trustworthiness; hardware Trojan insertion; hardware trojan identification; internal node controllability; security degradation; Controllability; Hardware; IP networks; Logic gates; Measurement; Trojan horses; Security Metric; Trustworthy Hardware;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    Design Automation Conference (DAC), 2014 51st ACM/EDAC/IEEE
  • Conference_Location
    San Francisco, CA
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1145/2593069.2596681
  • Filename
    6881500