Title :
Side-channel leakage on silicon substrate of CMOS cryptographic chip
Author :
Fujimoto, Daisuke ; Tanaka, Daiki ; Miura, Naruhisa ; Nagata, M. ; Hayashi, Yu-ichi ; Homma, Noriyasu ; Bhasin, Shubhendu ; Danger, Jean-Luc
Author_Institution :
Kobe Univ., Kobe, Japan
Abstract :
Power supply currents of CMOS digital circuits partly flow through a silicon substrate in their returning (ground) paths. The voltage bounce due to the substrate currents is seen wherever p+ substrate taps on a p-type die and regarded as a substrate noise. An on-chip waveform monitor confirms the side-channel leakage on the silicon substrate from an AES cryptographic module in a 65 nm CMOS demonstrator chip for the first time. The silicon substrate is essentially common to every circuit and inevitably carries the leakage to the observation taps located at the front as well as at the bottom surface of a die, even if the power and ground wires of an AES module are intentionally separated from the other building blocks. Substrate leakage channels may break the hiding of a cryptographic module regarding its location on a die. The physical properties including the distance dependency are experimentally explored.
Keywords :
CMOS digital integrated circuits; cryptography; elemental semiconductors; silicon; AES cryptographic module; CMOS cryptographic chip; CMOS demonstrator chip; CMOS digital circuits; Si; distance dependency; ground wires; on-chip waveform monitor; p-type die; power supply currents; side-channel leakage; silicon substrate; size 65 nm; substrate leakage channels; substrate noise; CMOS integrated circuits; Cryptography; Noise; Probes; Silicon; Substrates; System-on-chip;
Conference_Titel :
Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust (HOST), 2014 IEEE International Symposium on
Conference_Location :
Arlington, VA
Print_ISBN :
978-1-4799-4114-8
DOI :
10.1109/HST.2014.6855564