• DocumentCode
    1812003
  • Title

    Pricing and revenue sharing strategies for Internet service providers

  • Author

    He, Linhai ; Walrand, Jean

  • Author_Institution
    Dept. of Electr. Eng. & Comput. Sci., California Univ., Berkeley, CA, USA
  • Volume
    1
  • fYear
    2005
  • fDate
    13-17 March 2005
  • Firstpage
    205
  • Abstract
    One of the challenges facing the networking industry today is to increase the profitability of Internet services. This calls for economic mechanisms that can enable providers to charge more for better services and collect a fair share of the increased revenues. In this papery we present a generic model for pricing Internet services that are jointly offered by a group of providers. We show that non-cooperative pricing strategies between providers may lead to unfair distribution of profit and may even discourage future upgrades to the network. As an alternative, we propose a fair revenue-sharing policy based on the weighted proportional fairness criterion. We show that this fair allocation policy encourages collaboration among providers and hence can produce higher profits for all providers. Based on the analysis, we suggest a scalable algorithm for providers to implement this policy in a distributed way and study its convergence property.
  • Keywords
    Internet; game theory; pricing; Internet service providers; collaboration; fair allocation policy; noncooperative pricing strategies; revenue sharing strategies; weighted proportional fairness criterion; Collaboration; Computer networks; Convergence; Game theory; Helium; IP networks; Pricing; Profitability; Protocols; Web and internet services;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    INFOCOM 2005. 24th Annual Joint Conference of the IEEE Computer and Communications Societies. Proceedings IEEE
  • ISSN
    0743-166X
  • Print_ISBN
    0-7803-8968-9
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/INFCOM.2005.1497892
  • Filename
    1497892