DocumentCode :
1812615
Title :
PIKE: peer intermediaries for key establishment in sensor networks
Author :
Chan, Haowen ; Perrig, Adrian
Author_Institution :
Carnegie Mellon Univ., Pittsburgh, PA, USA
Volume :
1
fYear :
2005
fDate :
13-17 March 2005
Firstpage :
524
Abstract :
The establishment of shared cryptographic keys between communicating neighbor nodes in sensor networks is a challenging problem due to the unsuitability of asymmetric key cryptography for these resource-constrained platforms. A range of symmetric-key distribution protocols exist, but these protocols do not scale effectively to large sensor networks. For a given level of security, each protocol incurs a linearly increasing overhead in either communication cost per node or memory per node. We describe peer intermediaries for key establishment (PIKE), a class of key-establishment protocols that involves using one or more sensor nodes as a trusted intermediary to facilitate key establishment. We show that, unlike existing key-establishment protocols, both the communication and memory overheads of PIKE protocols scale sub-linearly (O(√n)) with the number of nodes in the network yet achieving higher security against node compromise than other protocols.
Keywords :
cryptography; peer-to-peer computing; protocols; telecommunication security; wireless sensor networks; PIKE; asymmetric key cryptography; network security; peer intermediaries for key establishment protocol; peer intermediary; resource-constrained platform; sensor network; symmetric-key distribution protocol; Base stations; Batteries; Computer architecture; Costs; Cryptographic protocols; Elliptic curve cryptography; Energy consumption; Intelligent networks; Peer to peer computing; Sensor phenomena and characterization;
fLanguage :
English
Publisher :
ieee
Conference_Titel :
INFOCOM 2005. 24th Annual Joint Conference of the IEEE Computer and Communications Societies. Proceedings IEEE
ISSN :
0743-166X
Print_ISBN :
0-7803-8968-9
Type :
conf
DOI :
10.1109/INFCOM.2005.1497920
Filename :
1497920
Link To Document :
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