Title :
An oligopolistic electricity model with marketable CO2 emission permits
Author_Institution :
Dept. of Manage. Sci., City Univ. of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China
Abstract :
In this paper, we derive an equilibrium model of the CO2 emission permits market. We consider a variational inequality (VI) approach to model an oligopolistic competition in the market of CO2 emission permits and electric power. A Cournot model of electricity market is described and variational inequality formulations are derived for oligopolistic electricity models with marketable CO2 permits. Solution method and a simple example is presented and implemented in a PC and solved by a built-in solver powered by GAMS.
Keywords :
oligopoly; power markets; Cournot model; electricity market; emission permits market; oligopolistic electricity model; variational inequality; Biological system modeling; Electricity; Electricity supply industry; Generators; Licenses; Marketing and sales; Optimization; CO2 emissions permits; electricity market;
Conference_Titel :
Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management (IEEM), 2010 IEEE International Conference on
Conference_Location :
Macao
Print_ISBN :
978-1-4244-8501-7
Electronic_ISBN :
2157-3611
DOI :
10.1109/IEEM.2010.5674201
