Title :
The limited corruption in first-price sealed auctions-experimental evidence
Author :
Jianbiao, Li ; Minda, Wang ; Wei, Li
Author_Institution :
Reserch Center of Corp. Governance, Nankai Univ., Tianjin, China
Abstract :
Based on the first-price sealed-bid auction model of limited corruption including risk aversion and risk neutral, parallel experiments have been conducted through LAN, with the purpose of testing the predictive ability of the model, as well as observing the efficiency of the first-price sealed-bid auction and the way that bidders behave in the presence of limited corruption. The study finds that mechanism of limited corruption has no effect on the efficiency of auction and the corruptors tend to be risk averse.
Keywords :
commerce; local area networks; pricing; LAN; bidder; first price sealed bid auction model; limited corruption; risk aversion; testing; Data models; Economics; Electronic mail; Local area networks; Predictive models; Procurement; Testing; experiment; first-price sealed-bid auction; limtied corruption; risk attitudes;
Conference_Titel :
Business Management and Electronic Information (BMEI), 2011 International Conference on
Conference_Location :
Guangzhou
Print_ISBN :
978-1-61284-108-3
DOI :
10.1109/ICBMEI.2011.5917051
