DocumentCode
1844093
Title
The limited corruption in first-price sealed auctions-experimental evidence
Author
Jianbiao, Li ; Minda, Wang ; Wei, Li
Author_Institution
Reserch Center of Corp. Governance, Nankai Univ., Tianjin, China
Volume
1
fYear
2011
fDate
13-15 May 2011
Firstpage
775
Lastpage
777
Abstract
Based on the first-price sealed-bid auction model of limited corruption including risk aversion and risk neutral, parallel experiments have been conducted through LAN, with the purpose of testing the predictive ability of the model, as well as observing the efficiency of the first-price sealed-bid auction and the way that bidders behave in the presence of limited corruption. The study finds that mechanism of limited corruption has no effect on the efficiency of auction and the corruptors tend to be risk averse.
Keywords
commerce; local area networks; pricing; LAN; bidder; first price sealed bid auction model; limited corruption; risk aversion; testing; Data models; Economics; Electronic mail; Local area networks; Predictive models; Procurement; Testing; experiment; first-price sealed-bid auction; limtied corruption; risk attitudes;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
Business Management and Electronic Information (BMEI), 2011 International Conference on
Conference_Location
Guangzhou
Print_ISBN
978-1-61284-108-3
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/ICBMEI.2011.5917051
Filename
5917051
Link To Document