An efficient and confirmed protocol for authenticated key agreement

The Diffie-Hellman protocol is vulnerable to a man-in-the-middle attack; the MTI group has recovered this vulnerability with shortage in providing key confirmation. The Pour key agreement system was invented to provide the key confirmation property while it doesn´t ´t satisfy the key control attributes. A previous proposal, to circumvent all these problems, was proposed by the authors of this paper, aimed to provide the key control attributes, but unfortunately it doesn´t support forward secrecy in case of long-term keys compromise. In this paper, we propose a secure two-pass AKC (authenticated key agreement with key confirmation) protocol in the asymmetric (public-key) setting, based on Diffie-Hellman key agreement, and we prove that it has the desirable attributes, which are discussed through. The proposal has been described in the discrete logarithmic setting over a finite field. We also compare our new protocol with others in terms of computational cost and security properties.