• DocumentCode
    1860263
  • Title

    Boxed Pigs and the External Incentives of Promoting Technological Innovation of Little and Medium-sized Enterprises

  • Author

    Peng, Xing-ting ; Peng, Sheng-ting

  • Author_Institution
    Law Sch., Xiamen Univ., Xiamen, China
  • fYear
    2010
  • fDate
    22-24 Jan. 2010
  • Firstpage
    401
  • Lastpage
    404
  • Abstract
    This article demonstrates the dilemma of the classic Boxed Pigs model, that is, ¿Strong is always Strong, Weak is weaker¿. Under these conditions, little and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) will not be able to form their own core competitiveness. Thus, this paper put forward an amended Boxed Pigs model, which is, through the external incentives and the improvement of the game rules, to ultimately change the balanced strategy of all parties. As a result of the strong positive externalities of technological innovation, the Government, as a breeder of making rules, has the responsibility to support and encourage SMEs to carry out technological innovation. And the government-led policy venture capital fund plays an important role in the process of promoting SMEs´ technological innovation.
  • Keywords
    game theory; innovation management; small-to-medium enterprises; SME; boxed pigs model; competitiveness; external incentives; game rules; government led policy venture capital fund; little and medium sized enterprises; technological innovation promotion; Costs; Electronic learning; Game theory; Government; Monopoly; Portfolios; Power generation economics; Presses; Pressing; Technological innovation; Boxed Pigs; SMEs; external incentives; technological innovation;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    e-Education, e-Business, e-Management, and e-Learning, 2010. IC4E '10. International Conference on
  • Conference_Location
    Sanya
  • Print_ISBN
    978-1-4244-5680-2
  • Electronic_ISBN
    978-1-4244-5681-9
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/IC4E.2010.44
  • Filename
    5432487