DocumentCode
1860263
Title
Boxed Pigs and the External Incentives of Promoting Technological Innovation of Little and Medium-sized Enterprises
Author
Peng, Xing-ting ; Peng, Sheng-ting
Author_Institution
Law Sch., Xiamen Univ., Xiamen, China
fYear
2010
fDate
22-24 Jan. 2010
Firstpage
401
Lastpage
404
Abstract
This article demonstrates the dilemma of the classic Boxed Pigs model, that is, ¿Strong is always Strong, Weak is weaker¿. Under these conditions, little and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) will not be able to form their own core competitiveness. Thus, this paper put forward an amended Boxed Pigs model, which is, through the external incentives and the improvement of the game rules, to ultimately change the balanced strategy of all parties. As a result of the strong positive externalities of technological innovation, the Government, as a breeder of making rules, has the responsibility to support and encourage SMEs to carry out technological innovation. And the government-led policy venture capital fund plays an important role in the process of promoting SMEs´ technological innovation.
Keywords
game theory; innovation management; small-to-medium enterprises; SME; boxed pigs model; competitiveness; external incentives; game rules; government led policy venture capital fund; little and medium sized enterprises; technological innovation promotion; Costs; Electronic learning; Game theory; Government; Monopoly; Portfolios; Power generation economics; Presses; Pressing; Technological innovation; Boxed Pigs; SMEs; external incentives; technological innovation;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
e-Education, e-Business, e-Management, and e-Learning, 2010. IC4E '10. International Conference on
Conference_Location
Sanya
Print_ISBN
978-1-4244-5680-2
Electronic_ISBN
978-1-4244-5681-9
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/IC4E.2010.44
Filename
5432487
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