• DocumentCode
    1862608
  • Title

    On the Moral Risk of the Franchised Enterprise in the Operation of Highway The Traffic Administrative Department on Behalf of Public Interest

  • Author

    Peng, Sheng-ting ; Peng, Xing-ting

  • Author_Institution
    Sch. of Politics & Law, Jiangxi Normal Univ., Nanchang, China
  • fYear
    2010
  • fDate
    22-24 Jan. 2010
  • Firstpage
    595
  • Lastpage
    598
  • Abstract
    Assuming that the traffic administrative department is on behalf of public interest, a model of game theory was established to illustrate the moral risk of the franchised enterprise in the operation of highway. This paper thought that to bring the franchised enterprise under regulation and to improve the supply efficiency of highway, we must make efforts from the following three aspects. First, increase punishment appropriately. Second, increase awards from the government. Third, support and help the franchised enterprise to reduce its daily operating cost.
  • Keywords
    cost reduction; game theory; government; public utilities; risk management; road traffic; awards; daily operating cost reduction; franchised enterprise; game theory; government; highway operation; moral risk; public interest; punishment; traffic administrative department; Costs; Electronic learning; Electronic mail; Ethics; Game theory; Government; Monopoly; Privatization; Road transportation; Traffic control; Franchised Enterprise; Game Theory; Highway; Moral Risk; Regulation;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    e-Education, e-Business, e-Management, and e-Learning, 2010. IC4E '10. International Conference on
  • Conference_Location
    Sanya
  • Print_ISBN
    978-1-4244-5680-2
  • Electronic_ISBN
    978-1-4244-5681-9
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/IC4E.2010.43
  • Filename
    5432579