DocumentCode
1862608
Title
On the Moral Risk of the Franchised Enterprise in the Operation of Highway The Traffic Administrative Department on Behalf of Public Interest
Author
Peng, Sheng-ting ; Peng, Xing-ting
Author_Institution
Sch. of Politics & Law, Jiangxi Normal Univ., Nanchang, China
fYear
2010
fDate
22-24 Jan. 2010
Firstpage
595
Lastpage
598
Abstract
Assuming that the traffic administrative department is on behalf of public interest, a model of game theory was established to illustrate the moral risk of the franchised enterprise in the operation of highway. This paper thought that to bring the franchised enterprise under regulation and to improve the supply efficiency of highway, we must make efforts from the following three aspects. First, increase punishment appropriately. Second, increase awards from the government. Third, support and help the franchised enterprise to reduce its daily operating cost.
Keywords
cost reduction; game theory; government; public utilities; risk management; road traffic; awards; daily operating cost reduction; franchised enterprise; game theory; government; highway operation; moral risk; public interest; punishment; traffic administrative department; Costs; Electronic learning; Electronic mail; Ethics; Game theory; Government; Monopoly; Privatization; Road transportation; Traffic control; Franchised Enterprise; Game Theory; Highway; Moral Risk; Regulation;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
e-Education, e-Business, e-Management, and e-Learning, 2010. IC4E '10. International Conference on
Conference_Location
Sanya
Print_ISBN
978-1-4244-5680-2
Electronic_ISBN
978-1-4244-5681-9
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/IC4E.2010.43
Filename
5432579
Link To Document