• DocumentCode
    1890836
  • Title

    Adding secure deletion to your favorite file system

  • Author

    Joukov, Nikolai ; Zadok, Erez

  • Author_Institution
    Stony Brook Univ., NY
  • fYear
    2005
  • fDate
    13-13 Dec. 2005
  • Lastpage
    70
  • Abstract
    Files or even their names often contain confidential or secret information. Most users believe that such information is erased as soon as they delete a file. Even those who know that this is not true often ignore the issue. Nevertheless, recovering deleted files is trivial and can be performed even by novice hackers. The problem is exacerbated by the widespread of portable and mobile storage devices. This type of unwanted after-deletion data recovery is in part an education problem. Users believe that deleted files are erased, even though they are not. Retraining and educating users is difficult. Therefore, storage systems should behave appropriately - the data should be erased from the storage on a per-delete basis. We found that existing solutions are either inconvenient, inefficient, or insecure. We have designed Purgefs: a file system extension that transparently overwrites files on the per-delete basis. Purgefs can be automatically added to a number of existing and future file systems, including networked and stackable file systems. Purgefs supports multiple policies to trade-off performance with the level of purging guarantees. We demonstrate that Purgefs does not add overheads or perturb users´ activity under typical user workloads
  • Keywords
    file organisation; security of data; after-deletion data recovery; networked file system; secure deletion; stackable file system; storage system; unintended data recovery; Biomedical optical imaging; Computer hacking; Credit cards; Cryptography; Data security; File systems; Hard disks; Hardware; Magnetic heads; Optical sensors; Security; Unintended data recovery;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    Security in Storage Workshop, 2005. SISW '05. Third IEEE International
  • Conference_Location
    San Francisco, CA
  • Print_ISBN
    0-7695-2537-7
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/SISW.2005.1
  • Filename
    1628483