DocumentCode :
1963812
Title :
The game study of engineering bidding mode and incentive mechanism
Author :
Rongjie Zhu ; Ying Peng ; Yang Sun ; Jianjun Gu
Author_Institution :
Coll. of Archit. & Environ., Sichuan Univ., Chengdu, China
Volume :
3
fYear :
2012
fDate :
20-21 Oct. 2012
Firstpage :
397
Lastpage :
399
Abstract :
The paper introduces the game theory briefly, reveals that the bidding game belongs to non-cooperative game and incomplete information static game, and uses the game theory to research the best bidding way of the tenderee in the lowest bidding mechanism, analysis through setting up a game model to get: the bidders may choose to fraud, the tenderee must design a incentive mechanism. The paper puts forward effective measures that the tenderee should take to realize the maximum expected utility, and establishes scientific bidding incentive mechanism.
Keywords :
civil engineering; game theory; incentive schemes; construction field; engineering bidding mode; incomplete information static game; lowest bidding mechanism; maximum expected utility; noncooperative game; scientific bidding incentive mechanism; Bidding; Game theory; Incentive mechanism;
fLanguage :
English
Publisher :
ieee
Conference_Titel :
Information Management, Innovation Management and Industrial Engineering (ICIII), 2012 International Conference on
Conference_Location :
Sanya
Print_ISBN :
978-1-4673-1932-4
Type :
conf
DOI :
10.1109/ICIII.2012.6340001
Filename :
6340001
Link To Document :
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