Title :
Priority service and max-min fairness
Author_Institution :
Dept. of Comput. Sci., Toronto Univ., Ont., Canada
Abstract :
We study a pricing scheme for networks which use priorities to provide differentiated quality of service. We consider the situation where users are free to choose the priority of their traffic, but are charged accordingly. We model this situation as a non-cooperative game, where users behave in a selfish manner and choose an allocation of priorities to packets to optimize their own net benefit. We show that there exists an unique equilibrium for this game and the bandwidth allocation in equilibrium is weighted max-min fair.
Keywords :
bandwidth allocation; costing; data communication; game theory; minimax techniques; packet switching; quality of service; tariffs; Internet; QoS; bandwidth allocation; data networks; differentiated quality of service; equilibrium; max-min fairness; noncooperative game; packet allocation priority; packet-based network; price-based resource allocation; pricing; priority service; traffic priority; Bandwidth; Channel allocation; Costs; IP networks; Pricing; Quality of service; Resource management; Telecommunication traffic; Traffic control; Web and internet services;
Conference_Titel :
INFOCOM 2002. Twenty-First Annual Joint Conference of the IEEE Computer and Communications Societies. Proceedings. IEEE
Print_ISBN :
0-7803-7476-2
DOI :
10.1109/INFCOM.2002.1019268
