Title :
Research on the Incentive and Disciplinary Mechanism for the Owner to Strengthen the Management of the Engineering Consultancy in a Project
Author :
Yan Xiaoli ; Ye Feng
Author_Institution :
Sch. of Manage. Studies, Shanghai Univ. of Eng. Sci., Shanghai, China
Abstract :
The relationship in a project between the owner and the consultants is commission-deputy. The problem of opportunism and risk of morality according to information dissymmetry between them will affect the service quality of the project consulting. Effective incentive and disciplinary mechanism must be constructed to coordinate the relationship. The actuality and impediments that exist in the management of the consultancy are analyzed in this paper, then four suggestions including the rational selection and engagement of the consultancy, the reasonable establishment of the contract structure, the effective work method, the environment guarantee are given about how to establish the incentive and disciplinary mechanism to facilitate the owner´s management of the consultancy to get project success.
Keywords :
consultancies; contracts; incentive schemes; project management; contract structure; disciplinary mechanism; effective work method; engineering consultancy; environment guarantee; incentive; information dissymmetry; morality risk; project management; rational selection; service quality; Civil engineering; Construction industry; Contracts; Economics; Educational institutions; Research and development management;
Conference_Titel :
Internet Technology and Applications, 2010 International Conference on
Conference_Location :
Wuhan
Print_ISBN :
978-1-4244-5142-5
Electronic_ISBN :
978-1-4244-5143-2
DOI :
10.1109/ITAPP.2010.5566586