Title :
Co-evolution in negotiation games
Author :
Murakami, Yukikazu ; Sato, Hiroshi ; Namatame, Akira
Author_Institution :
Dept. of Comput. Sci., Nat. Defense Acad., Yokosuka, Japan
Abstract :
In this paper, we focus on the mechanism of co-evolution in the negotiation situations. We formulate negotiation situations as hawk-dove games. It is an interesting question to answer how the society gropes its way towards equilibrium in an imperfect world when self-interested agents learn each other in order to improve the rules of interaction. It is known the mixed strategy will result in equilibrium in hawk-dove games, and both hawks and doves coexist. In this paper, we consider evolutionary dynamics with local matching and investigate the role of the mutual learning. We show that all agents gradually learn to behave as doves, which result in social efficiency
Keywords :
evolutionary computation; game theory; learning (artificial intelligence); software agents; agents; co-evolution; equilibrium; evolutionary dynamics; hawk-dove games; local matching; mixed strategy; self-interested agents; social efficiency; Computer science; Displays; Frequency; Game theory; Genetic mutations; Injuries; Lattices;
Conference_Titel :
Computational Intelligence and Multimedia Applications, 2001. ICCIMA 2001. Proceedings. Fourth International Conference on
Conference_Location :
Yokusika City
Print_ISBN :
0-7695-1312-3
DOI :
10.1109/ICCIMA.2001.970473
