DocumentCode :
1998028
Title :
A DPA/DEMA/LEMA-resistant AES cryptographic processor with supply-current equalizer and micro EM probe sensor
Author :
Fujimoto, Daisuke ; Miura, Noriyuki ; Hayashi, Yu-ichi ; Homma, Naofumi ; Aoki, Takafumi ; Nagata, Makoto
Author_Institution :
Kobe Univ., Kobe, Japan
fYear :
2015
fDate :
19-22 Jan. 2015
Firstpage :
26
Lastpage :
27
Abstract :
Combination of a supply-current equalizer (EQ) and a micro EM probe sensor (EMS) exhibits strong resiliency against major three DPA/DEMA/LEMA low-cost side-channel attacks on a cryptographic processor. Test-chip measurements with 128bit AES cryptographic processor in 0.18μm CMOS successfully demonstrate the secret key protection from all three attacks. A digital-oriented circuit implementation together with a careful design optimization minimize the hardware overhead of EQ and EMS to +33%, +1.6% in area, +7.6%, +0.15% in power, and ~0%, -0.2% in performance of an unprotected AES, respectively.
Keywords :
CMOS integrated circuits; equalisers; microprocessor chips; optimisation; power aware computing; private key cryptography; 0.18μm CMOS; 128bit AES cryptographic processor; DPA-DEMA-LEMA-resistant AES cryptographic processor; EMS; EQ; design optimization; digital-oriented circuit implementation; hardware overhead; low-cost side-channel attacks; microEM probe sensor; secret key protection; supply-current equalizer; test-chip measurements; CMOS integrated circuits; Calibration; Cryptography; Equalizers; Hardware; Probes; Semiconductor device measurement;
fLanguage :
English
Publisher :
ieee
Conference_Titel :
Design Automation Conference (ASP-DAC), 2015 20th Asia and South Pacific
Conference_Location :
Chiba
Print_ISBN :
978-1-4799-7790-1
Type :
conf
DOI :
10.1109/ASPDAC.2015.7058929
Filename :
7058929
Link To Document :
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