Title :
Network reciprocity on spatial prisoner´s dilemma games by Continuous-binary strategy
Author :
Kishimoto, N. ; Kokubo, S. ; Tanimoto, J.
Author_Institution :
Interdiscipl. Grad. Sch. of Eng. Sci., Kyushu Univ. Kasuga-koen, Kasuga, Japan
Abstract :
For 2 × 2 games, especially the Spatial Prisoner´s Dilemma (SPD), most of the previous studies presumed that players can offer either cooperation (C) or defection (D), the so-called discrete strategy. In this paper, we define Continuous-binary strategy instead of discrete strategy. And a systematic series of numerical simulations reports that it enhances the network reciprocity for SPD. This new strategy is based on our previous finding that continuous and mixed strategy are robust in boundary games of Chicken and PD (BCH), and Stag Hunt and PD (BSH), respectively. The new strategy allows to put both advantages of continuous and mixed strategies on usual discrete strategy together in one model.
Keywords :
game theory; network theory (graphs); numerical analysis; BCH game; BSH game; Chicken and PD game; SPD game; Stag Hunt and PD game; boundary game; continuous-binary strategy; discrete strategy; network reciprocity; numerical simulation; spatial prisoners dilemma game; Continuous-binary strategy; enhancement; network reciprocity; prisoner´s dilemma games;
Conference_Titel :
Soft Computing and Intelligent Systems (SCIS) and 13th International Symposium on Advanced Intelligent Systems (ISIS), 2012 Joint 6th International Conference on
Conference_Location :
Kobe
Print_ISBN :
978-1-4673-2742-8
DOI :
10.1109/SCIS-ISIS.2012.6505166