DocumentCode
2020865
Title
A simple view of type-secure information flow in the π-calculus
Author
Pottier, Francois Pottier
Author_Institution
INRIA, France
fYear
2002
fDate
2002
Firstpage
320
Lastpage
330
Abstract
One way of enforcing an information flow control policy is to use a static type system capable of guaranteeing a noninterference property. Noninterference requires that two processes with distinct "high"-level components, but common "low"-level structure, cannot be distinguished by "low"-level observers. We state this property in terms of a rather strict notion of process equivalence, namely weak barbed reduction congruence. Because noninterference is not a safety property, it is often regarded as more difficult to establish than a conventional type safety result. This paper aims to provide an elementary noninterference proof in the setting of the π-calculus. This is done by reducing the problem to subject reduction - a safety property - for a nonstandard, but fairly natural, extension of the π-calculus, baptized the <π>-calculus.
Keywords
equivalence classes; pi calculus; security of data; type theory; π-calculus; barbed reduction congruence; information flow control; noninterference; process equivalence; static type system; Calculus; Computer security; Conferences; Encoding; Information analysis; Leak detection; Safety; Timing;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
Computer Security Foundations Workshop, 2002. Proceedings. 15th IEEE
ISSN
1063-6900
Print_ISBN
0-7695-1689-0
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/CSFW.2002.1021826
Filename
1021826
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