• DocumentCode
    2020865
  • Title

    A simple view of type-secure information flow in the π-calculus

  • Author

    Pottier, Francois Pottier

  • Author_Institution
    INRIA, France
  • fYear
    2002
  • fDate
    2002
  • Firstpage
    320
  • Lastpage
    330
  • Abstract
    One way of enforcing an information flow control policy is to use a static type system capable of guaranteeing a noninterference property. Noninterference requires that two processes with distinct "high"-level components, but common "low"-level structure, cannot be distinguished by "low"-level observers. We state this property in terms of a rather strict notion of process equivalence, namely weak barbed reduction congruence. Because noninterference is not a safety property, it is often regarded as more difficult to establish than a conventional type safety result. This paper aims to provide an elementary noninterference proof in the setting of the π-calculus. This is done by reducing the problem to subject reduction - a safety property - for a nonstandard, but fairly natural, extension of the π-calculus, baptized the <π>-calculus.
  • Keywords
    equivalence classes; pi calculus; security of data; type theory; π-calculus; barbed reduction congruence; information flow control; noninterference; process equivalence; static type system; Calculus; Computer security; Conferences; Encoding; Information analysis; Leak detection; Safety; Timing;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    Computer Security Foundations Workshop, 2002. Proceedings. 15th IEEE
  • ISSN
    1063-6900
  • Print_ISBN
    0-7695-1689-0
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/CSFW.2002.1021826
  • Filename
    1021826