Arrangements of agents with social value orientation in line land

In this paper, we examine arrangements of social agents that have social value orientations (SVOs). SVOs differ in terms of two value systems: (1) concern. with the well being of others and (2) concern with well being of self. Agents are allocated in line land space and they play randomly generated N-persons games. Based on the SVOs, the agents intend to get high satisfactions. In these random games, the agents can observe other´s SVOs in neighbor. If the neighbor size is small than game range, that is, N, the agents can´t predict the result of games and they will lose the payoff. Under this setting, we will examine what kinds of arrangements of SVOs are effective to get high satisfaction. To search arrangements, we compare two approaches, one is bottom up approach as local swapping of SVOs and another is top down approach as evolutionary search. Throughout this comparison, we examine the comparison of arrangements and role of SVOs