Multi-User Collusion Behavior Forensics: Game Theoretic Formulation of Fairness Dynamics

Multi-user collusion is an cost-effective attack against digital fingerprinting, in which a group of attackers collectively undermine the traitor tracing capability of digital fingerprints. However, during multi-user collusion, each colluder wishes to minimize his/her own risk and maximize his/her own profit, and different colluders have different objectives. Thus, an important issue during collusion is to agree on how to distribute the risk/profit among colluders and ensure fairness of the attack. To have a better understanding of the attackers´ behavior during collusion to achieve fairness, this paper models the dynamics among colluders as a non-cooperative game. We then study the Pareto-optimal set, where no colluder can further increase his/her own payoff without decreasing others´, and analyze the Nash bargaining solution of this game.