• DocumentCode
    2048582
  • Title

    Approaches to transmission planning: A transmission expansion game

  • Author

    Molina, J.D. ; Contreras, J. ; Rudnick, H.

  • Author_Institution
    Electr. Eng. Dept., Pontificia Univ. Catolica de Chile, Santiago, Chile
  • fYear
    2012
  • fDate
    22-26 July 2012
  • Firstpage
    1
  • Lastpage
    8
  • Abstract
    Defining and making decisions about network investments has become a hard task in a competitive environment. This work defines a methodology to look for expansion alternatives in a transmission system. We propose a Transmission Expansion Game model that consists of four main elements: i) generating transmission expansion plan scenarios, ii) valuation of a project based on the design of a linear contract, bargaining solutions and hidden actions, iii) optimal value of a risky investor´s portfolio made up of several projects, and iv) transmission cost allocation with wind energy assets. The results obtained show that the model developed is efficient to solve the combinatorial problem. A principal-agent model obtains the real costs of the bidders and creates incentives for disclosure of information. The private optimal portfolio and bargaining for allocation cost gives evidence for the central planner to adjust the project assignment process and to carry out the proposed expansion plan efficiently. To test the methodology we analyze the Chilean Central Interconnected System.
  • Keywords
    combinatorial mathematics; decision making; game theory; investment; power transmission economics; power transmission planning; Chilean central interconnected system; combinatorial problem; decision making; linear contract; network investments; principal-agent model; private optimal portfolio; project assignment process; transmission cost allocation; transmission expansion game model; transmission planning; transmission system; wind energy assets; Contracts; Cost accounting; Economics; Investments; Optimization; Portfolios; Resource management; Conditional Value at Risk (CVaR); Principal-Agent model; Transmission expansion game; bidding contract; game theory; incentives; investment; meta-heuristic; multi-objective optimization; ordinal;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    Power and Energy Society General Meeting, 2012 IEEE
  • Conference_Location
    San Diego, CA
  • ISSN
    1944-9925
  • Print_ISBN
    978-1-4673-2727-5
  • Electronic_ISBN
    1944-9925
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/PESGM.2012.6344921
  • Filename
    6344921