DocumentCode :
2053383
Title :
Sensitivity analysis to hardware Trojans using power supply transient signals
Author :
Rad, Reza ; Plusquellic, Jim ; Tehranipoor, Mohammad
Author_Institution :
Univ. of Maryland, Baltimore, MD
fYear :
2008
fDate :
9-9 June 2008
Firstpage :
3
Lastpage :
7
Abstract :
Trust in reference to integrated circuits addresses the concern that the design and/or fabrication of the IC may be purposely altered by an adversary. The insertion of a hardware Trojan involves a deliberate and malicious change to an IC that adds or removes functionality or reduces its reliability. Trojans are designed to disable and/or destroy the IC at some future time or they may serve to leak confidential information covertly to the adversary. Trojans are cleverly hidden by the adversary to make it extremely difficult for chip validation processes, such as manufacturing test, to accidentally discover them. This paper investigates a power supply transient signal analysis method for detecting Trojans that is based on the analysis of multiple power port signals. In particular, we focus on determining the smallest detectable Trojan in a set of process simulation models that characterize a TSMC 0.18 um process.
Keywords :
power supply circuits; sensitivity analysis; TSMC; chip validation processes; hardware Trojans; integrated circuits; power supply transient signal analysis method; sensitivity analysis; Analytical models; Circuit simulation; Current supplies; Hardware; Integrated circuit modeling; Power supplies; Sensitivity analysis; Signal analysis; Testing; Transient analysis;
fLanguage :
English
Publisher :
ieee
Conference_Titel :
Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust, 2008. HOST 2008. IEEE International Workshop on
Conference_Location :
Anaheim, CA
Print_ISBN :
978-1-4244-2401-6
Type :
conf
DOI :
10.1109/HST.2008.4559037
Filename :
4559037
Link To Document :
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