“Learning by trying”: simulating strategic behavior in group decision making

The discussion on introducing (semi-) autonomous working groups recently has received more attention, because empirical studies (E. Ulich, 1991) show that the higher identification of employees with their work leads to increasing productivity rates. Nevertheless some authors (E. Egger, 1995) demonstrate that working teams deal with planning responsibility quite ambivalently. It depends mainly on two aspects whether the planning task is experienced as benefit or burden, namely on the constellation of group members and the underlying power structure. Based on this idea, the paper deals with bargaining situations of working groups. The focus is on the interdependence between the “operational level” and “interrelation level” (E. Egger and H. Hanappi, 1994). It is shown how the power structure and strategic behaviors of group members influence the quality of the decisions. Various simulation runs based on a typical Petri net illustrate the differences between power equality and hierarchies, both cases with several types of strategic behavior of group members