• DocumentCode
    2088060
  • Title

    Using model checking to analyze network vulnerabilities

  • Author

    Ritchey, Ronald W. ; Ammann, Paul

  • Author_Institution
    Booz, Allen & Hamilton Inc., Falls Church, VA, USA
  • fYear
    2000
  • fDate
    2000
  • Firstpage
    156
  • Lastpage
    165
  • Abstract
    Even well administered networks are vulnerable to attacks due to the security ramifications of offering a variety of combined services. That is, services that are secure when offered in isolation nonetheless provide an attacker with a vulnerability to exploit when offered simultaneously. Many current tools address vulnerabilities in the context of a single host. We address vulnerabilities due to the configuration of various hosts in a network. In a different line of research, formal methods are often useful for generating test cases, and model checkers are particularly adept at this task due to their ability to generate counterexamples. We address the network vulnerabilities problem with test cases, which amount to attack scenarios, generated by a model checker. We encode the vulnerabilities in a state machine description suitable for a model checker and then assert that an attacker cannot acquire a given privilege on a given host. The model checker either offers assurance that the assertion is true on the actual network or provides a counterexample detailing each step of a successful attack
  • Keywords
    computer networks; security of data; telecommunication security; attack scenarios; computer network security; formal methods; model checking; network vulnerabilities; state machine description; test cases; Computer bugs; Computer networks; Information filtering; Information filters; National security; Network servers; Software engineering; Web server;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    Security and Privacy, 2000. S&P 2000. Proceedings. 2000 IEEE Symposium on
  • Conference_Location
    Berkeley, CA
  • ISSN
    1081-6011
  • Print_ISBN
    0-7695-0665-8
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/SECPRI.2000.848453
  • Filename
    848453