DocumentCode :
2088164
Title :
An efficient, dynamic and trust preserving public key infrastructure
Author :
Levi, Albert ; Caglayan, M. Ufuk
Author_Institution :
Dept. of Comput. Eng., Bogazici Univ., Istanbul, Turkey
fYear :
2000
fDate :
2000
Firstpage :
203
Lastpage :
214
Abstract :
Nested certification is a methodology for efficient certificate path verification. Nested certificates can be used together with classical certificates in the Public Key Infrastructures (PKIs). Such a PKI, which is called nested certificate based PKI (NPKI), is proposed as an alternative to classical PKI. The NPKI formation model is a transition from an existing PKI by issuing nested certificates. Thus, we can extract efficiently verifiable nested certificate paths instead of classical certificate paths. NPKI is a dynamic system and involves several authorities in order to add a new user to the system. This uses the authorities´ idle time to the benefit of the verifiers. We analyze the trade-off between the nested certification overhead and the time improvement on the certificate path verification. This trade-off is acceptable in order to generate quickly verifiable certificate paths. Moreover, PKI-to-NPKI transition preserves the existing hierarchy and trust relationships in the PKI, so that it can be used for strictly hierarchical PKIs
Keywords :
authorisation; certification; public key cryptography; NPKI formation model; PKI-to-NPKI transition; Public Key Infrastructures; certificate path verification; classical certificate paths; dynamic system; nested certificate based PKI; nested certification; nested certification overhead; strictly hierarchical PKIs; trust preserving public key infrastructure; trust relationships; verifiable certificate paths; verifiable nested certificate paths; Certification; Content addressable storage; Hip; ISO standards; Internet; Postal services; Privacy; Public key; Public key cryptography; Tellurium;
fLanguage :
English
Publisher :
ieee
Conference_Titel :
Security and Privacy, 2000. S&P 2000. Proceedings. 2000 IEEE Symposium on
Conference_Location :
Berkeley, CA
ISSN :
1081-6011
Print_ISBN :
0-7695-0665-8
Type :
conf
DOI :
10.1109/SECPRI.2000.848458
Filename :
848458
Link To Document :
بازگشت