DocumentCode
2088164
Title
An efficient, dynamic and trust preserving public key infrastructure
Author
Levi, Albert ; Caglayan, M. Ufuk
Author_Institution
Dept. of Comput. Eng., Bogazici Univ., Istanbul, Turkey
fYear
2000
fDate
2000
Firstpage
203
Lastpage
214
Abstract
Nested certification is a methodology for efficient certificate path verification. Nested certificates can be used together with classical certificates in the Public Key Infrastructures (PKIs). Such a PKI, which is called nested certificate based PKI (NPKI), is proposed as an alternative to classical PKI. The NPKI formation model is a transition from an existing PKI by issuing nested certificates. Thus, we can extract efficiently verifiable nested certificate paths instead of classical certificate paths. NPKI is a dynamic system and involves several authorities in order to add a new user to the system. This uses the authorities´ idle time to the benefit of the verifiers. We analyze the trade-off between the nested certification overhead and the time improvement on the certificate path verification. This trade-off is acceptable in order to generate quickly verifiable certificate paths. Moreover, PKI-to-NPKI transition preserves the existing hierarchy and trust relationships in the PKI, so that it can be used for strictly hierarchical PKIs
Keywords
authorisation; certification; public key cryptography; NPKI formation model; PKI-to-NPKI transition; Public Key Infrastructures; certificate path verification; classical certificate paths; dynamic system; nested certificate based PKI; nested certification; nested certification overhead; strictly hierarchical PKIs; trust preserving public key infrastructure; trust relationships; verifiable certificate paths; verifiable nested certificate paths; Certification; Content addressable storage; Hip; ISO standards; Internet; Postal services; Privacy; Public key; Public key cryptography; Tellurium;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
Security and Privacy, 2000. S&P 2000. Proceedings. 2000 IEEE Symposium on
Conference_Location
Berkeley, CA
ISSN
1081-6011
Print_ISBN
0-7695-0665-8
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/SECPRI.2000.848458
Filename
848458
Link To Document